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AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE OF PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: PREMISING
LIABILITY ON SEXUAL, RATHER THAN POWER DYNAMICS
When confronted with allegations that the boys in his
classroom were sexually harassing one of his female students, a
sixth grade teacher casually remarked that, "Eve was so beautiful
that the guys would be all over her in a couple of years."'
Unfortunately, the antics of her male classmates did not make
Eve feel beautiful; rather, she felt "unsafe and depressed."2 Her
male peers referred to her as a "prostitute," "lesbian," "whore,"
and "ugly dog faced bitch."3 The young girls in Eve's class
complained to their teachers that the boys were snapping their
bras, groping their breasts, caressing their backs, and cutting
their hair.4 Despite Eve's protests, the behavior continued and
the school did nothing. One of Eve's teachers, however, regarded
the boys' behavior as innocent flirting and teasing, because after
all, "Eve was beautiful." This teacher's response to the problem
of peer sexual harassment reflects the prevalence of the view, in
society and by extension in the legal community, that peer sexual
harassment in American elementary and secondary schools is an
innocuous emergence of sexual curiosities and attractions among
adolescent students. The behavior, however, even if innocent, is
dangerous.
The nonchalant approach of school officials in American
schools to the problem of peer sexual harassment implicity
condones its existence and ignores the harms suffered by girls
who are entrusted to the care of the school districts.5 Hostile
learning environments unduly undermine the ability of female
students to receive the full benefits of an education. As Title IX
prohibits sexual discrimination in the schools, the question arises
whether the failure of school districts to protect girls from peer
sexual harassment renders the schools liable for monetary
damages under the statute. In effect, by deciding not to act
against the problem, the school officials discriminate against
1. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F.Supp. 162, 167 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
2. Id. at 166.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. One study reports that as of 1993, 82% of American schools ignore the problem of
sexual harassment in their midst. See N. STEIN ET AL., RESEARCH ON WOMEN AT
WELLESLEY COLLEGE AND THE NOW LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 11 (1993). Even when school administrators were made
aware of a specific incident, 45% of them still did not react. Id.
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female students. A recognition and definition of a private claim
for damages under Title IX is crucial considering the inability of
7
the administrative process, 6 as well as state common law claims,
to redress the problem. Before society can eliminate the harms
that girls suffer because of peer sexual harassment, the courts
must properly designate and allocate legal responsibility for the
problem under current statutory and jurisprudential directives.
This paper will analyze the problem of peer sexual
harassment as a natural manifestation of the biological drives in
women and men. Through an understanding of peer sexual
harassment in evolutionary terms, this paper will propose legal
responses to the issue of institutional liability and the
appropriateness of Title VII workplace hostile environment
jurisprudence in the educational context. Part I will provide an
overview of the statistical and anecdotal data on peer sexual
harassment in American secondary schools. Part II will describe
the biological drives of the harassers and the biological responses
of the harassed, as well as assess the different impact peer sexual
harassment has on each gender. Part III will present an outline
of the past and present legal treatment of the issue. And Part IV
will synthesize the evolutionary propositions with the legal
doctrine and pose administrative solutions to the problem.
I.

THE STATISTICAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Concerned organizations and social scientists have conducted
surveys and field studies in order to explore to what extent
sexual harassment affects school children and thwarts the
educational process. The data reveal that both sexes encounter
sexual harassment in the schools. Unlike the adult workplace,
high percentages of both females and males in junior high and
high school reported peers having subjected them to harassment
of a sexual nature.8 The numbers are alarming. In June of
6. See Kirsten M. Eriksson, Note, 83 GEo. L.J. 1799, 1805-1806 and nn.40-41 (1995).
7. Suits based on theories of assault, battery, or intentional infliction of emotional
distress are rarely successful. See Monica L. Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just Child's
Play: School Liability under Title IX for Peer Sexual Harassment,141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2142 (1993). Further, few state legislatures have taken initiatives to address the issue.
See Eriksson, supra note 6, at 1804-1805 and nn.40-41. Lack of state-based protections
and administrative efficaciousness highlights the need for a federal private cause of action
under Title IX.
8. Usually, male workers do not report the same level of sexual harassment as
women. For example, in one study that included 23,000 randomly selected federal
employees, 15/ of the men reported being subjected to sexual harassment, whereas 42%
of the women reported being sexually harassed during the two year period of the study.
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1993, the American Association of University Women Education
Foundation (AAUW) published "Hostile Hallways: the AAUW
Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools."9 The survey
recorded the responses of public school students in grades eight
through eleven from 79 schools throughout the continental United
States. The 1,632 students who responded to the survey indicated
that 85 percent of the girls and 76 percent of the boys
experienced some form of sexual harassment at school.10 The
primary instigators were not adults; they were peers. Eighty-six
percent of the harassed girls and 71 percent of the harassed boys
pointed out that most of the incidents occurred between
students." The students reported that sexual harassment was
most prevalent between the sixth and eighth grade, with only six
percent of the students facing the harassment for the first time
12
before the third grade.
The Center for Research on Women at Wellesley College and
the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund supplemented the
AAUW study, with "Secrets in Public: Sexual Harassment in Our
Schools," a study focusing its attention on the exposure of the
female student population to sexual harassment. 3 Of the 2,000
female students polled, 89 percent experienced inappropriate
sexual comments, gestures, and looks, and 83 percent reported
males touching, grabbing or pinching them at school.14 Sexual
harassment became a daily part of school life for 39 percent of

See Kathleen McKinney & Nick Maroules, Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL COERCION 29,
40 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski eds., 1991).
9. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATION FOUNDATION, HOSTILE
HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 7

[hereinafter 1993 AAUW Study].
10. See id.
11. See id. See also Jill Suzanne Miller, Note, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 707 (1995)
(pointing out that peer sexual harassment is more common than faculty-student
harassment).
12. The survey also requested that the students specify the type of harassment they
encountered. See 1993 AAUW STUDY, supra note 9 at 8-10. Seventy-six percent of the girls
and 56 percent of the boys reported that peers made sexual comments, jokes, gestures, or
looks. See id. at 9. Less children suffered an attack on their bodily integrity, with 65
percent of the girls and 42 percent of the boys claiming that peers touched, grabbed, or
pinched them in a sexual way. See id. Relatively equal numbers of girls and boys, with
31 percent of the girls and 34 percent of the boys, reported sexual harassment in the form
of showing, giving, or leaving sexual pictures, photos, illustrations, messages or notes. See
id. Peers, however, were twice as likely to accuse boys of being gay rather than accusing
girls of being lesbian. See id. at 10. Only ten percent of the girls faced such accusations,
while 23 percent of the boys claimed peers harassed them in this manner. See id.
13. N. STEIN ET AL., supra note 5.

14.. See id. at 2.
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the girls who responded to the survey.15 Most harassment
promulgated against girls involved commentary on their bodies,
as well as an emphasis on sexuality as their most significant
Girls also complained that boys make direct
attribute.1 6
allegations that they are sexually active or promiscuous.17 In
general, data suggest that male harassers target girls for the
more serious verbal and physical assaults.18 Further, girls have
a greater tendency to allow the harassing behavior to affect their
lives, their grades, and their sense of well-being.' 9
Anecdotal evidence demonstrates how sexual harassment can
severely hamper the educational and personal development of
female students. A high school freshman, Sarah Conrow,
described how fellow band members poked her in the behind with
drum sticks, and later called her derogatory and sexually
suggestive names in the hallway. 2° In another school district,
male schoolmates regularly barraged an eighth-grade girl on the
bus with comments such as: "When are you going to let me fuck
you?"; "What bra size are you wearing?"; and "What size panties
are you wearing?" 2' Later they swatted her behind, grabbed her
genital area, and groped her breasts in public.2 Another girl
became powerless to retain her own identity after graffiti
scrawled in the boys bathroom declared her a "slut" and callously
told readers among other things, that she had "sucked the dick"

15. See id.
16. See JUNE LARKIN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: HIGH SCHOOL GIRLS SPEAK OUT 79 (1994).
Girls take from the harassing comments, a feeling that their sexuality is their most
significant attribute. In fact, boys communicate to girls that the their relationships with
male friends are contingent upon sexual accessibility. See id.
17. See id. Girls and boys deal with allegations that they are sexually permiscuous
in two distinct ways. Girls feel compelled to defend their reputation whereas boys engage
in a "practice of telling stories about stuff they've done with girls whether it is true or
not." Id.
18. See Ellen Goodman, Sexual Bufies, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, June 6, 1993, available
in 1993 WL 6596154.
19. For example, 33% of girls surveyed, report not wanting to go to school versus 12%
of the boys. See 1993 AAUW STUDY, supra note 9 at 15. See infra notes 73-76 &
accompanying text (discussing the potential impact of harassment on the quality and
effectiveness of a girl's education).
20. See Gina Pera, Agony of Sexual Harassment: Two Sides, USA WEEKEND, Sept. 8,
1996, available in 1996 WL 7817203. Sarah responded to an essay contest soliciting
information regarding peer sexual harassment from secondary school female students. She
ignored the harassment for fear of appearing as a "tattle tale." Id.
21. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist. 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (Fifth Circuit April 2,

1996).
22. See id.
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of a classmate'
The graffiti spurred inquiries from random male
students such as "Are you as good as everyone says?"' 4 Another
high school girl summed up her experience by saying, "I've had
boys put their hand in my shirt, ask me if I was a virgin, and
touch my body. It is humiliating."'
Male students target not only individuals, but also engage in
a broad campaign of sexual harassment. The abuse ranges from
ranking girls according to "who would be good in bed," to the
daily snapping of bra straps.2
Boys greet girls with crotch
grabbing gestures and shout obscenities as girls travel school
halls.
Daily exposure to this degrading behavior, whether
comments, gestures, or touching, places a tremendous toll upon
female victims, as well as same gender observers of the
behavior.28 Even though statistics in documented surveys depict
sexual harassment as a problem for both girls and boys, three
considerations prod legal and social science commentators to
reserve more concern for the plight of young girls than that of
boys in American schools. For one, surveys suggest that boys are
less likely to label the harassing behavior as unwanted or
unwelcome, but rather view the behavior as complimentary.2
Second, evidence indicates that sexual harassment traumatizes
girls more than boys.A0
Third, as boys are more reluctant to
report sexual harassment, most personal accounts and legal
disputes involve cases of students sexually harassing female
31
students.
Traditional feminists, therefore, view peer sexual harassment
as a problem implicating the rights of women.32 Such feminists
23. Katy Lyle, Sexual Harassment in the Boy's Room: One Teen's True Story, CHOICES,
Jan. 1993.
24. See id.
25. NAN STEIN & LISA SJOSTRoM, FuIRTNG OR HURTING? 98 (1994) (citing Adrian Nicole
LeBlanc, Harassmentat School: The Truth is Out, SEVENTEEN, May 1993, at 134, 134).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. The Department of Education recognizes that the sexual harassment of a girl, not
only constitutes a hostile environment for that particular student, but for her female
classmates who witness the harassing behavior as well. See Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed.
Reg. 12033-12051 (1997) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Guidance] (visited March 21,
1997) <http//www.gpoucop.educgi-bin/gpogate... Wdata/1997_register/frm13mr97.dat.wais>.
29. See LARKIN, supra note 16, at 35.
30. See STEIN & SJOSTROM, supra note 25, at 29.
31. See 1993 AAUW STUDY, supra note 9, at 14.
32. Most legal and social science literature addressing sexual harassment is feminist
in perspective. The feminist approach is based on two assumptions: (1) socialization and
enculturation are primary forces shaping human behavior; and (2) the desired goal of men
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propose that through peer sexual harassment, male students
ensure their present and future maintenance of power and
Evolutionary biology
advantage over females in society.33
theories, however, may provide a better explanation for why
sexual harassment is so common in American schools and why
peer sexual harassment results in graver consequences for female
victims.3 For evolutionists, pervasive peer sexual harassment in
schools reflects sexual motivations that exist in both adolescents
and adults, rather than a male agenda to forge an unequal
distribution of power between the genders.3 The societal bias to
focus on power issues, without investigation into the sexual goals
of males and females, precludes achievement of a full
understanding of the phenomenon of peer sexual harassment in
the schools and the formulation of appropriate legal and social
responses.

II. EVOLuTIONARY

THEORIES ON PEER SEXUAL

HARASSMENT

A. Internal Drive of the Harasser
Both internal and external forces influence how the sexes
interact in American schools.36 An emphasis on only external
is patriarchal power; therefore, men oppress women through sexual aggression and
See Michael V. Studd, Sexual Harassment, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT:
violence.
EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 54, 55 (David M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth
eds., 1996). See Wendy E. Stock, Feminist Explanations: Male Power, Hostility, and
Sexual Coercion, in SEXUAL COERCION 61, 62 (Elizabeth Grauerholtz & Mary A. Koralewski,
eds., 1991) ("Power inequality is seen as the root of all forms of discrimination and violence
directed at women; it is the result of and represents an attempt to maintain that
imbalance.").
33. See Stock, supra note 32, at 61-62. Feminists emphasize economic solutions to
combat the incidence of sexual harassment, as well as other forms of sexually coercive
behavior directed towards women in society. See Heidi Gottfried, Preventing Sexual
Coercion:A Feminist Agenda for Economic Change, in SEXUAL COERCION 173-183 (Elizabeth
Grauerholtz & Mary A. Koralewski, eds., 1991).
34. Further, studies also reveal that the harm to adolescent girls may be greater than
the harm to adult women in the workplace. See Miller, supra note 11, at 708.
35. See id. Catharine MacKinnon, however, advocates that sexuality itself is a
heirarchal construct. That is, even in the case of sexual harassment between coequals, an
inherent imbalance of power exists between the genders. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
Sex and Violence: A Perspective (1981), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 85, 89 (1987) [hereinafter
Sex and Violence]. The courts generally interpret harassment between coequals, hostile
environment situations, as a maldistribution of power. The imbalance, however, occurs
because female victims of harassment view male harassers as agents of those higher on
the heirarchal ladder, rather than primarily because they are males harassing females.
36. See TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING
LINKS BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR 75 (1991) ("Biologists have recognized for decades
that the process of development involves an interplay between information coded in the
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causes of peer sexual harassment, that is cultural and social
stimuli, produces an incomplete explanation of the problem. An
analysis must also consider the internal drive for sex that colors
the way males, as well as females, react to sensory information
within the social environment.3 7 The reasons why boys harass
girls are more complex than a mere conformance to what society
advocates or a solitary lust for power. Evolutionary biology
proposes that strategies devised to maximize sexual access to
3
women, rather than inculcated beliefs, shape male behavior. 8
Boys' conscious or unconscious need to achieve reproductive
success, which is necessary to ensure that their genes survive
through the generations, determines some behavioral patterns.39
This biological urge, not power itself or the belief that women are
inferior, encourages boys to engage in sexually harassing
behavior.
Evolutionists propound that males seek one or two long-term
mating relationships in conjunction with numerous short-term
sexual commitments. 40 Males do not want to invest large
amounts of time and energy for every reproductive encounter. A
male reserves parental investment for a limited number of
offspring. 41 There is a presumption, however, that all females
desire a male who will parentally invest in their offspring.
Females have the capacity to conceive significantly less offspring
42
than males; therefore, they guard their mating opportunities.

genome (genetic factors) and a continuum of external signals influencing how that
information is expressed (epigenetic processes).").
37. In essence, peer sexual harassment implicates both internal factors, such as an
internal need for sex, and external factors, such as societal disregard and fear of women.
The internal drive for sex determines how boys will react to external pressures and
influences provided by the school environment, and society as a whole. Id. at 73.
38. See Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, The Evolutionary Psychology of
Men's Coercive Sexuality, 15 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 363 (1992).
39. Social biologists attempt to analyze social behaviors of animals "armed mainly with
the presumption that the purpose of such behavior is the maximization of reproductive
success." MELVIN KONNER, THE TANGLED WING: BIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE HUMAN
SPIRrr 15 (1982).
40. "For the 'optimal male course,' as Trivers noted, is a 'mixed strategy.' Even if
long-term investment is their main aim, seduction and abandonment can make genetic
sense, provided it doesn't take too much, in time and other resources, from the offspring
in which the male does invest. The bastard youngsters may thrive even without paternal
So
investment; they may, for that matter, attract investment from some poor sap ....
males in a high MPI species should, in theory, be ever alert for opportunistic sex." ROBERT
WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 61 (1994).
41. See id.
42. "[Tihere is a large sexual asymmetry in the minimal reproductive effort required
for the production of offspring. The minimum for a man is a few minutes of time and an

336

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 3:329

If a female surrenders to a male, she expects in return a long
term pair bond with that male. 43 Whereas a man chooses a few

women with whom he will share parenting responsibilities," in
every instance a female seeks males who will provide sufficient
resources and protection for herself and her offspring. 45 As a
consequence, the sexual goals of males 46
and females conflict when
term.
short
the
for
mate
to
males seek
B. Response to Conflicting Reproductive Goals: Seduction and
Coercion
A male's evolutionary programming assumes that short-term
mating activity leads to a higher number of offspring who will
carry his genes. 47 The increase in the number of offspring he
fathers, inevitably, means an increase in the probability that that
some of those offspring will survive and pass his genetic code onto
future generations. While males want to have these short-term
mating opportunities, females naturally maintain a desire for
long-term mating relationships. Males must, therefore, "coerce"
females to participate in short term sexual activity that is against
a typical female's "evolutionary" self-interest.'
energetically cheap ejaculate; the minimum for a woman is nine months of pregnancy and
a long period of lactation." Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 38, at 366.
43. WRIGHT, supra note 40, at 59-60.
44. The fear of cuckoldry is high in such relationships because the male does not want
to make a huge investment in offspring that are not genetically tied to him. Males,
therefore, select females who appear coy and reserved for such an endeavor. Further, in
an effort to produce offspring with a higher probability of survival, the male chooses mates
whom he considers genetically superior to other females. Two of the most important
aspects a male looks for in a long-term mate are "her reproductive value and the likelihood
that this value will be channeled exclusively to him." DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF
DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING 156 (1991).
45. "Sexual selection on females in human evolutionary history favored individuals who
could gain access to males whose resources and genetic endowment could promote the
survival of offspring." Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 38, at 366. In addition, females
who pursue promiscuous mating strategies become more vulnerable to sexual coercion and
infanticide, for they lack the protection of a loyal male associate and the "respect" that
serves to inhibit other males from attacking the mates of fellow males. Barbara Smuts,
Male Aggression against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective, 3 HUMAN NATURE 1, 10
(1992).
46. "In the sexual arena [] a man who seeks sex without investing in his partner short
circuits a mating goal of many women, who want greater emotional commitment and
higher material investment." Buss, supra note 44, at 143. See also Smuts, supra note 45,
at 3.
47. Women, however, regardless of an increase in mating activity may only conceive
a limited number of offspring.
48. "[Slometimes males attempt to overcome female resistance by employing force, or
the threat of force." Smuts, supra note 45, at 3.
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Males utilize two stratagem, in addition to honest courtship,
to achieve sexual access: deceiving females about their intentions
to mate for the long term, that is seduction, or forcing females to
The emergence of small artificial
mate, that is rape.49
communities that were not part of the primal biological
environment, like the school or the workplace, has compelled
males to create a third sexual strategy to increase their sexual
access -- sexual harassment.5° /This strategy occupies a place
somewhere on the continuum that extends between seduction and
violent force. 51 Accordingly, the harassment manifests itself in
different forms, combining various levels of seduction and
aggression.
C. Sexual Strategies in the Educational Setting
Seduction is the most attractive of the three alternatives to
gain access to females. The seduce and abandon method allows
the male to monopolize the female for a short period of time
without the force necessary with rape,5 2 thereby enhancing the
likelihood of conception, 53 as well as providing him with greater
assurance that the offspring are in fact his. The seduce and
abandon method produces efficient results for the male population
as a whole, however, male students in a, school context are
unlikely to achieve the same level of success.- 4
The inability of boys to capitalize on the seduce and abandon
method stems from two considerations. First, in the primal
,49. See Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 38, at 366.
50. See Studd, supra note 32, at 56.
51. Males subject females to an array of adapted aggressive and violent behavior in
order to gain sexual access. Males choose behavior that irvolves a mixture of artifice and
violence; however, the less crafty the male, the more likely violence will be the final
expression. As one educator commented:
If we really think about it, sexual assault almost always begins with some
type of harassment: a threatening comment, a menacing look, an unwanted
touch. This is why the concept of a continuum is so important: it helps us
to see how the various forms of violence are connected and it gives us a sense
of the spectrum of violence in women's lives. By the time young women reach
high school, they have usually come to accept male violence as an inescapable
part of life and many have already experienced it. Sexual harassment at
school is just part of the bigger picture.
LARKIN, supra note 6, at 25.
52. Rape involves serious cost disincentives, like potential injury to the male and to his
family members, or loss of status or resources. See Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 38,
at 366.
53. There is a lower probability that pregnancy will result from a rape.
54. See WRIGHT, supra note 40, at 62.
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biological environment, school communities did not exist and
younger boys had to compete with older, higher status males for
females. Male students, on average, have acquired less resources
in comparison with their older counterparts. Females, however,
55
seek high status males who can provide resources and safety.
Evolutionary programming, therefore, informs young boys that
their inferior status inevitably will inhibit their mating
opportunities. This programming remains with young males,
despite the fact that modern societal structure promotes dating
among school students because girls tend to gravitate towards
those males with whom they have the most social exposure.5
Second, an unfavorable reputation hinders male attempts to
gain sexual access to females. Even if a male student has
sufficient status, the small school community with an active flow
of information, diminishes the capacity of the most savvy male to
convince a girl his intentions are honorable. He may succeed
initially; however, a negative reputation will check his future
efforts to mate. Thus, in order to procure sexual access, male
school students resort to a means other than the seduce and
abandon method.
D. Marginalizationof Girls to Increase Sexual Accessibility
Frustrated in their efforts to obtain short-term sexual access
through deception, male school students may move further on the
continuum towards coercion. Sexual harassment has evolved as
an evolutionary compromise between the extremes of seduction
and rape.57 The harassment operates in a similar fashion as
rape, however, with a far lower level of force and violence. In the
wild, scientists observe primates that compel females to copulate,
as well other primates who rarely utilize coercive tactics to attain
sexual access. Between these extremes, some species "do not
force copulation but nonetheless use threats and intimidation to
55. "Men's willingness to use sexual coercion should be related to their social status.
Women prefer as mates men of high economic and social status. Sexual access to
preferred mates (young and attractive) is thus positively correlated with the status,
resource holdings, and prestige of a man." Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 38, at 367.
56. Mechanisms selected in ancestral environments remain an integral part of male
thinking even if the surrounding environment presents a different external reality than
that provided by the ancestral environment. See Buss, supra note 44; Studd, supra note
32, at 61. "The effect of an adaptation on current reproduction does not identify the
evolutionary function of the adaptation because the current environment may differ from
the evolutionary environment that generated the selection that designed the adaption."
Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 38, at 365.
57. Aggressive and violent male tendencies may surface as sexual harassment.
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get sex."8 This behavior is akin to the adapted tactic amongst
human males of sexually harassing females.
Utilizing sexual harassment, boys hope to emotionally
marginalize girls in order to increase the likelihood that the girls
will submit to sexual overtures. In essence, the aggression
enables boys to exercise control over a girl's sexuality. Both rape
and sexual harassment employ aggression to gain sexual access.
Rape, however, uses absolute force to achieve the ultimate goal
of penetration, whereas, sexual harassment employs aggression in
order to increase the effectiveness of seductive efforts. Modern
society views sexual harassment with less opprobrium than rape;
therefore, young boys have adapted to choose this sexual strategy
in the schools. 59
The marginalization for greater access approach, however, is
contingent upon the evolved tendencies of females. Peer sexual
harassment has a two-fold agenda: the instigation of fear and the
deterioration of female self esteem. As females instinctively view
the behavior as a predicate to more serious forms of aggression,
fear is a natural reaction to the more aggressive types of sexual
Scientists recognize a pattern among male
harassment.60
primates to use aggression as a means to train females to submit
to male sexual, advances. 61 In American schools, teenage girls
reveal that sexual harassment creates. a threatening
environment. 62 Girls no longer feel safe at school and fear that
58. Barbara Smuts, Apes of Wrath, DiscovER, Aug. 1995, at 35, 36.
59. Men consider rape, however, as personally acceptable *when there is no chance of
being caught or punished." Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 38, at 373.
60. The most common reaction of female students to sexual harassment is fear. As one
girl explained, 'A lot of girls don't feel very secure at school .. .[y]ou get scared in school.
After a certain while you get really scared about all the situations." LARKIN, supra note
16, at 101. This tactic of using harassment as a threat creates an atmosphere of perpetual
insecurity for girls. See id. See also, Mosesto City Sch., OCR Case No. 09-93-1391 (last
modified Feb. 15, 1997) <http//www.ed.gov/office/OCP,/peers00.html> (OCR discovered that
several girls feared going to school because of the harassment.).
61. Jane Goodall describes in her book, The Chimpanzees of Gombe, how male primates
rely upon aggression to overcome female resistance if they are unable to lure estrous
females away for one-on-one sexual encounters. See Smuts, supra note 58 (making
reference to the book).
62. The escalation of the coercive nature of the harassment to more violent acts despite
the presence of societal restrictions and taboos is a very real danger. Society can not idly
tolerate peer sexual harassment, not only because the behavior is far from innocuous in
and of itself, but also because it can lead to progressively more violent and aggressive acts
against female students.
The high incidence of date rape in secondary schools
demonstrates the need to counteract less severe manifestations of aggression and violent
behavior in young males. See Casey Banas, Ex-Nurse Tells High Schoolers of Date-Rape
Horrors, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 18, 1997 available in 1997 WL 3521833; Heather Wickes,
Unfortunately Date Rape a Grim Reality for Students, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, March 7,
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sexual harassment will escalate into more serious acts against
Many girls, in order to avoid the looming violent
them.13
consequences, choose to minimize their losses and grant sexual
access.64
More significantly, peer sexual harassment also enables boys
to gain sexual access by facilitating a subtle attack on the
self-esteem of young girls.6 Sexual harassment has become a
pervasive evolutionary tool to break down the natural barriers
that girls erect in order to prevent boys from gaining sexual
access. A long gestation period and a capability to conceive only
a limited number of offspring drives women to emphasize quality
As a result, women typically hoard their
over quantity.6
reproductive opportunities and reserve them only for worthy
males. A female's conviction that she can and must be selective
constructs a barrier that hampers males' sexual access to her. In
67
order to gain access, boys must overcome this barrier.
"Madonnas," or sexually coy females, deny sexual access until
they receive adequate assurance that the male will invest in their
offspring.6
The male sexual preference in most instances for
short-term mating opportunities, however, demands that another
category of women also exist, the "whores."
As whores settle for a lesser resource and time contribution
from males, the natural drive of males to massively distribute
1996 available in 1996 WL 616191. Further, 49.5% of the women who report being
sexually assaulted, first encountered sexually violent behavior when they were under the
age of seventeen. See LARKIN, supra note 16, at 24. In fact, 60% of college age men admit
that if the right circumstances existed, they would use force,, rape, or both in sexual
relations with women. See id.
63. One student explained, "Some guys might get sexsually harassed but they're not in
the same boat as we are. We're afraid to walk down the street." Id. at 35.
64. In the wild, male primates use aggression "to train a female to fear him so thatshe will be more likely to surrender to his subsequent sexual advances." Smuts, supra
note 58, at 36.
65. Research indicates that women are less prone than men to value themselves as
people: "women have lower self esteem than men do; women do not value their efforts as
much as men do; women are less self-confident than men; women are more likely than
men to repress their anger and to say they are "hurt" than to admit they are angry."
CAROL TAVRIS, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMEN 27 (1992).
66. "[Flemales do not benefit by mating with every male who comes their way.
Females benefit from being choosy about their mates because some males provide better
genes than others, or because some males are better able or more willing to provide the
female with resources, parental care, protection, or other benefits that aid female
reproduction." Smuts, supra note 45, at 3.
67. "Because women are more selective about mates and more interested in evaluating
them and delaying copulation, men, to get sexual access, must often break through
feminine barriers of hesitation, equivocation, and resistance." Thornhill & Thornhill, supra
note 38, at 366.
68. See WRIGHT, supra note 40.
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their genetic codes necessitates the existence of women who grant
access under these conditions. Males identify women as ideal for
either long-term or short-term mating according to the
madonna/whore dichotomy. Some women, even though it is
Sexual
against their sexual best interest, become whores.
which
boys
through
process
as
a
conditioning
operates
harassment
marginalize certain girls by neutralizing their inclination to be
selective. Peer sexual harassment, therefore, guarantees that
male students in totem will gain greater access to a marginalized
portion of the female population. The sexual harasser will not
necessarily obtain access to the girl he harasses; but, by
participating in a shared male agenda, each harasser increases
the probability of access for the whole. 69
E.

Evolutionary Impact of Peer Sexual Harassment

Once identified as sexual beings, girls feel violated and
Surveys and interviews indicate that harassing
isolated."0
behavior has a significant impact on a young girl's self-esteem,
whereas boys report being less affected.71 For instance, the girl
alluded to earlier, who endured getting poked by a drumstick
responded, "These guys were making me seem like something I
wasn't. It was hurting my entire self-image and reputation."7 2
Another girl interviewed noted, "when I get sexually harassed, I
73
feel like I don't exist."
Every harassing act engenders in girls the feeling that they
are inferior persons.7 4 Sexual harassment impedes the emotional
and educational development of young girls who admit feeling
69. Posses have emerged as a popular way in which young males bond in order to
obtain greater sexual access for their group. Interestingly, the harassers become "cool"
from the perspective of other students, including females. Many females begin to seek
their attention. See Alexandra A. Bodnar, Note, Arming Students for Battle: Amending
itle IX to Combat the Sexual Harassment of Students by Students in Primary and
Secondary School, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 549, 549-552 (1996).
70. Fellow female students do not come to the aid of harassed classmates.
"Considering the hostile environment, the silence of the other young women can be seen
as a reasonable strategy for securing their own safety." LARKIN, supra note 16, at 119.
As a result female students feel isolated from the rest of the community, and boys break
down female bonds.
71. "Adolescence seems to be a time when many girls begin to shut down and I believe
sexual harassment has a lot to do with this. Sexual harassment can slowly erode young
women's confidence and self-esteem and make it difficult for them to develop a positive
female identity." LARKIN, supra note 16, at 102.
72. Pera, supra note 20.
73. LARKIN, supra note 16, at 32.
74. See id. at 102.
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75
embarrassed, afraid, angry, frustrated, and powerless in school.
The ramifications extend beyond the psychological, as girls report
suffering physical symptoms like insomnia, listlessness, and
depression.7 6 In the end, the manifestation of concrete consequences, such as absenteeism, tardiness, decreased classroom participation, and poor scholastic performance illustrate the severe impact
harassing behavior has on a girl's ability to receive an equal

education.

77

Feminists correctly emphasize these negative impacts on
female development and advancement as cause to eradicate
sexual harassment; however, they also theorize that males harass
solely to achieve these outcomes.7 8 Evolutionary theory and
mainstream feminist scholarship diverge at this juncture.
According to evolutionary logic, males harass to lower self-esteem
as a means to enlarge sexual accessibility, not to thwart female
achievement and procurement of resources. In essence, the
motivation is sex, not power. 79 Boys emotionally marginalize
particular girls to create greater sexual access to these girls.
Understandably, girls interpret sexual harassment as behavior
motivated by a desire for power.80 After all, as a result of the
harassment, most girls feel powerless, not sexually aroused.8 '
75. Responses solicited from female students include feeling embarrassed and
self-conscious, losing confidence, and being afraid or confused. See 1993 AAUW STUDY,
supra note 9, at 16-17.
76. See Sherer, supra note 6, at 2134.
77. See id.
78. See Studd, supra note 32. "No research has conclusively shown that sexual
attention is used as a means to achieve a power goal, rather than, for example, power
being used as a means to achieve a desired sexual goal." Id. at 56. In fact, sexual
harassment is more about social interaction, than a power struggle. Research indicates,
for example, that sexual harassment is more prevalent and persistent in the service sector
rather than in an office setting. One social scientist introduced the "social contact
hypothesis" to explain this data. He asserts that the existence of more social interaction
in the service sector presents the opportunity for males to agressively pursue their sexual
interests. Id. at 74. As schools afford an even greater chance for peers to socially interact,
it becomes logical that peer sexual harassment has a higher incidence in the schools than
in the workplace. The harassment is tied to social opportunities, rather than a need for
power.
79. See id. at 54.
80. For example, one girl expressed, "[d]espite its name, [sexual harassment] has less
to do with sex than power. For instance the guy that harassed me was obviously not
interested in me sexually. All he was interested in was making me feel uncomfortable and
intimidated. He just used sexual words and gestures to accomplish this." STEIN &
SJOSTROM, supra note 25, at 64. The boys behavior, however, ultimately had sexual
underpinnings, because his evolutionary objective was to obtain sexual access by making
her feel uncomfortable. See Sex and Violence, supra note 35.
81. See Sex and Violence, supra note 35 The males, however, are sexually aroused.
Both noncoercive and coercive sex arouses rapists. See Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen
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The perception of girls, however, does not preclude a finding that
sexual motivations, not contests for power and economic gain,
underlie peer sexual harassment.
Social scientists observe a correlation between self-esteem and
sexual promiscuity among women. Women with lower self-esteem
tend to be less selective in their mating activities.8 2
Lower
self-esteem
manifests itself as a general
feeling of
unattractiveness in girls. Women who perceive themselves as less
attractive assume they have less of chance to garner male
attentions through sexual reserve.
These women become
promiscuous and receive smaller amounts of resources from a
series of males, rather than seeking significant contributions from
83
one or two male sources.
A "gradual molding of sexual strategy" develops in response
to stimuli a girl receives from her external environment.
Perceived unattractiveness is neither inherent nor epiphanic,
however, once a girl feels worthless her mating response is
biologically predetermined.84
A girl with low self-esteem will
become more receptive to sexual activity on less than ideal
Darwinian terms. 85 Studies indicate that assurances of beauty
cultivate a high self-esteem in teenage girls, which in turn
encourages sexual restraint.86 By correlation, girls who possess
low self-esteem do not exercise sexual restraint. Therefore, if
peer sexual harassment can contribute to female students' sense
of low worth, the behavior chips away at the female preference
87
for selectivity when choosing a mate.
F.

Different Impacts on Girls and Boys

Peer sexual harassment impacts girls more severely than
boys. Twice the number of girls than boys in schools report
negative emotional reactions to sexually harassing incidents.88
The fact that female students suffer more serious repercussions
Thornhill, Coercive Sexuality of Men: Is There Psychological Adaptation to Rape?, in
SEXUAL COERCION 91, 101 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski eds., 1991).
82. See WRIGHT, supra note 40, at 84.
83. Robert Wright notes, 'less attractive women, with less chance to hit the jackpot via
sexual reserve, become more promiscuous, extracting small chunks of resources from a

series of males." Id.
84. See id. at 83.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 84-85.
87. As an aside, the wearing down of this protective wall may contribute to the high
percentage of teenage pregnancies.
88. 1993 AAUW STUDY, supra note 9, at 16-17.
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from the harassing behavior corresponds to their evolved sexual
objectives. As females possess significantly fewer reproductive
opportunities than males, they tend to be more protective of their
sexual resources.
Males, however, do not have the same
reproductive restrictions as women, and welcome most chances to
copulate. Accordingly, boys tend to view sexual harassment as an
invitation rather than a threat.8 9 Even if boys experience peer
sexual harassment to the same extent as girls, evolutionary
biology
informs
society
that
the
harassment
will
disproportionately affect the girls.
Boys, however, are not the only perpetrators of peer sexual
harassment. The AAUW survey indicated that 57 percent of the
boys who reported being sexually harassed were targeted by a
single girl; 35 percent of those same boys were harassed by a
group of girls. 9°
Examples of sexually harassing behavior
provided by the male victims included comments on the size of
their reproductive organs, jokes about the extent of their sexual
experience, being called "gay," and unwanted patting of their
bottoms as they pass.9 1
Girls may use these comments and actions to denigrate a
boy's sexual prowess or attack his masculinity. In this context,
women may believe such behavior will serve to protect them by
making males more sexually insecure. 92 On the other hand, girls
may choose these comments or actions, other than allegations
regarding a boy's sexual preferences, to encourage and fortify the
male sexual ego. For instance, teasing about the size of a male's
organ may involve praise on the organ's largesse, rather than its

89. See LARKIN, supra note 16, at 35. One girl interviewed commented:
I know one female who harasses guys . .. She'll go right up and grab their
rear end. She'll say things to them like "hi, sexy" or "What are you doing
tonight?" A few of the guys have actually come over to her, after she says
that. And I'm afraid for her because if she keeps that up she could get in
trouble. If the guy comes over and starts talking to her ... he might think
she likes him in that kind of way and he might try some thing she doesn't
want him to. It might turn out to be something pretty bad."

Id.
90. See STEIN & SJOSTROM, supra note 25, at 29.
91. See Id.
92. Unfortunately for girls, from an evolutionary perspective if a male is emasculated
or feels insecure, then he is more likely to resort to force and violence in order to procure
reproductive access. "Ironically, girls who harass boys often jeopardize their own safety."
LARKIN, supra note 16, at 35. As such, when girls engage in sexually harassing behavior,
they in effect exacerbate the problem by creating a class of males who are more likely to
rape. Peer sexual harassment, therefore, increases the threat to girls in either context,
whether as the harassed or the harasser.
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tininess. In effect, the harassment could serve to aggrandize
males confidence in their sexual desirability.
The only type of harassment that elicited a response of "very
upset" from boys was accusations of being gay. 93 These attacks
on their sexual status understandably caused uneasiness from an
evolutionary perspective. Homosexual activity does not produce
offspring. Usually other males make such comments in order to
lower the status of their sexual competitors. Furthermore, even
if a girl does make similar statements, the impact is less severe
because boys do not regard her as a competitor for the same
sexual resources. The fact that boys view peer sexual harassment
from girls as more complimentary than threatening, coupled with
the fact that boys are most often harassed by a girl acting alone
(a less threatening situation than if the perpetrators were a group
of individuals or a boy acting alone), translates into a lesser
likelihood that the harassment will cause serious harm. These
factors render predictable the observance that boys suffer less
harm from peer sexual harassment than girls in American
schools.
III.

THE LAW

Analogizing Title IX sexual harassment claims to those
recognized under a Title VII analysis, the courts are attempting
to transfer the legal proscriptions against "hostile environment"
sexual harassment in the workplace to the problems surrounding
peer sexual harassment in American schools. The issue becomes,
therefore, whether a cognizable private claim against the school
district for sexual discrimination exists under Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972, 94 when fellow students
sexually harass a female student and school officials fail to take
prompt remedial measures. As neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has provided sufficient guidance on the issue, 9 a uniform
rule regarding the liability of school districts for peer sexual
harassment has not yet emerged. 6
93. See 1993 AAUW STUDY, supra note 9, at 20.
94. Education Ainendments of 1972, § 901(a), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681-88 (1997).
95. 'Given the enormous social implications for students, schools, and parents, this
court wishes that Congress would step in and simply tell us whether it intended to make
school districts responsible for the payment of damages to students under these
circumstances. Knowing that that will not occur, the court does its best to decipher
Congressional intent." Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412,
1412, No. C 94-3056, 1996 WL 526274, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 27, 1996).
96. "The appellate court decisions do not present a uniform rule with regard to whether
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In the fall of 1996, the Supreme Court avoided reconciliation
of the conflict in the circuits when it denied certiori in a Fifth
.Circuit case, Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District.7 In
this case, the court refused to interpret Title IX to allow
institutional liability for peer sexual harassment and explicitly
disagreed with the opposite conclusion drawn by the Eleventh
Circuit98 in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education?9

The

court in Davis sustained a female student's private cause of
action against school officials who negligently responded to her
allegations of peer sexual harassment. 1°° The Fifth and the
Eleventh Circuits demonstrate the extremes on the issue, thereby
opening the district courts to an onslaught of peer sexual
harassment litigation. 1 1 This section will analyze and synthesize
the legal alternatives proffered by the differing courts and
attempt to formulate a uniform standard of institutional liability.
A.

Sexual HarassmentJurisprudence

Before undertaking a study of the recent attempts to protect
girls from sexual harassment in the schools, an overview of
workplace sexual harassment jurisprudence is beneficial. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964102 entitles women to equal
treatment in employment through its prohibitions against sexual
a student must prove an intent to discriminate on the part of the educational institution
to state a valid claim for monetary damages for peer - to - peer sexual harassment." Id.
at *6.
97. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 165 (1996). Mother brought
action under Title IX on behalf of daughters, alleging that the school district tolerated and
contributed to hostile environment sexual harassment. She sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as compensatory damages for the peer sexual harassment that her
daughters endured in school and on the school bus. The Fifth Circuit issued its decision
on April 2, 1996. Id.
98. Id. at 1010 n.8.
99. A fifth grade student sued the school district for injunctive relief as well as
compensatory damages in light of its failure to take any meaningful action when a fifth
grade male student sexually harassed her on a continuous basis over a five month period.
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996), rehg en banc granted,
91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the decision by the
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia to dismiss plaintiffs
action for failure to state a claim. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ. 862 F.
Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
100. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194.
101. See Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., No. C 94-3056, 1996 WL
526274, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 27, 1996) ("Resolution of this issue has yielded conflicting
opinions in the appellate courts as to what proof is necessary to state a claim for money
damages ....

).

102. 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1997).
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discrimination. 10 3
Sexual harassment adversely affects the
employment status of the victim on the basis of gender, and
therefore, the courts have interpreted the statutory language of
Title VII to prohibit both "quid pro quo" and "hostile
environment" sexual harassment in the workplace. 1°4
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an individual
in a supervisory position attempts to extract sexual favors from
a subordinate in exchange for employment security or
advancement."°5 By premising favorable employment conditions
upon adherence to these sexual overtures, the supervisor is, in
essence, singling out the victim on the basis of her gender. As
the terms of employment are different for the female victim than
for her male counterparts, quid pro quo sexual harassment
presents a clear example of sexual discrimination. 106
The more tenuous arguments arise in the context of
establishing hostile environment sexual harassment as a form of
sexual discrimination. For example, when a female employee
endures hostile environment sexual harassment from her
supervisors or co-workers, the employee must not "do" anything
additional to receive the same employment treatment; however,
as a result of the harassment, the conditions of her employment
are more unfavorable than those of her male peers. According to
the Supreme Court, conduct that is "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment" constitutes hostile
environment sexual harassment. 07 Further, if the victim endures
this oppressive atmosphere solely because of her membership in
a class protected by Title VII, and the employer chooses to allow
the abusive environment to continue, the employer discriminates
against the victim on the basis of her gender.'w

103. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer '(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, of national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify

his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aXl) (1997).
104.
105. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996).
106. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62-65 (1986).
107. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citing Meritor Say. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, at 67 (1986)).
108. Id. See also Title VII, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1997).
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Hostile environment sexual harassment jurisprudence is in
flux; uncertainty still surrounds the reasoning upon which courts
have based institutional liability. A five part test, however, has
emerged from the foray, even though the fifth element is still one
of major contention. A prima facie case for hostile environment
sexual harassment must allege five elements: (1) that the victim
belongs to a protected group; (2) that the victim was the subject
of unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was
based on her sex; (4) that the sexual harassment effected a term,
condition or privilege of employment; and (5) that the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
remedial action. 1°9 To justify imposing liability when employers
do not possess actual notice of harassment under the fifth
element, courts emphasize the agency dimension of the
relationship between the harasser and the employer, 110
"[tiherefore, liability for a hostile work environment created by a
co-worker may be imputed to an employer even though the
employer possesses no direct knowledge of the hostile
environment because the co-worker is an agent of the
Thus, constructive notice is sufficient to render the
employer."'
responsible for curing sexual harassment in the
employer legally
12
workplace.
Although the plain language of the fifth element intimates a
negligence standard, some courts manifest a reluctance to
relinquish the requirement that the employer exhibited an intent
to discriminate."13 These courts maintain that hostile work
environment sexual harassment "is a type of intentional
discrimination, but the intent is established by proof of the
elements required to prove the cause of action and needs no
additional proof.""11 4 When a plaintiff, therefore, alleges that an
employer should have been aware of objectively severe and
pervasive sexual harassment in the workplace, the plaintiff
implicitly alleges that the employer's lack of response was
synonymous with an intent to discriminate on the basis of the
plaintiffs gender. 1 5 Further, these courts eschew premising
employer liability upon respondeat superior principles and rather
109. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F.Supp. 162, 174 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (citing Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the Blind, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 151, 155 (S.D.N.Y.1990)).
110. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69-74 (1986).
111. Bruneau, 935 F.Supp. at 173.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 173-74.
114. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F.Supp. 1415, 1424 (N.D.Cal. 1996).
115. See id. at 1422-23.
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emphasize the intentional action or inaction of the employer as
the basis for liability under Title VII for hostile work environment
sexual harassment." 6 The relevance of whether a court hinges
employer liability on agency principles or on claims that an
employer exhibited a pure intent to discriminate by ignoring the
problem is minimal in the hostile environment sexual harassment
cases under Title VII. In the school context, however, as students
are not agents of the school district, the type of reasoning adopted
is critical when applying Title VII jurisprudential principles to a
hostile environment peer sexual harassment claim under Title IX.
Reliance on agency principles as the source of liability for
employers can effectively block a student's chance of recovery for
peer sexual harassment through the legal system.
B.

Title IX Jurisprudence

Congress specifically exempted educational institution
employees from liability for sexual discrimination under Title
VII.'"
Legislative history, however, suggests that Congress
enacted Title IX with the intention of extending the same equal

employment protections excluded from Title VII to employees in
the education sector." 8

Another class of citizens, students, are

also at risk in the educational setting. 119 Title IX, therefore, not
only ensures equal employment opportunities for female
employees, but also equal educational opportunities for female

students. 12°

Title IX requires, in relevant part, that "[n]o person

in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any educational program or activity
"...
,121
receiving Federal financial assistance .
The substantive import of Title IX's statutory language
parallels Title VII's proscriptions for workplace behavior.
116. See Bruneau, 935 F.Supp. at 170.
117. See Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F.Supp. at 1421. The 1972 Amendments to the
Act, however, removed the education exemption. See Eriksson, supra note 6, at 1803 n.28.
In addition, gender was not included as a prohibited classification within Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1997).
118. See Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp., at 1421.
119. See id. ("[Tihis Court discerns in Title IX no intent to provide a lesser degree of
protection to students than to employees.").
120. Female students initially utilized Title IX to challenge discriminatory practices in
athletic programs and admission policies. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74
F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1996). The scope of Title IX's application, however, is broader
than these 'access" factors. See Eriksson, supra note 6, at 1804.
121. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (1997).
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Procedurally, however, Title VII and Title IX are critically
different from a jurisprudential perspective. Congress passed
Title IX, as it did Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination
by federally funded programs in a non-educational setting,
pursuant to the Spending Clause.122 Accordingly, Congress
conditions an educational institution's receipt of federal funds
upon its compliance with the directives of Title IX, as well as
with the agency guidelines created to effectuate the goals of the
statute.

123

Congress derives its authority to impose Title IX duties upon
the school districts from its power to disburse funds as it deems
proper. As such, the schools are on notice that if they fail to
follow the statutory mandates of Title IX then they risk losing
federal funding. 124 In theory, the recipient considers the burdens
tied to receipt of the funds before accepting the money. 125 If a
future judicial or administrative action extends the legal
obligations of the recipient beyond its expectations, the recipient
"has the option of withdrawing and hence terminating the
prospective force of the injunction."12 Judicial recognition of
private causes of action, not explicitly included in a Spending
Clause statute, exposes the recipient to additional financial
liability which may alter its decision to accept the funds.1 27 Two
judicial responses result from the fact that Title IX is a Spending
Clause statute. First, courts are reluctant to recognize implicit
rather than explicit obligations under Title IX. Second, courts are
wary of granting broad based remedies under the statute if they
find an implicit violation of Title IX. 128

122. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. SuPP. 162, 172 n.9
(N.D.N.Y 1996).
123. See Sherer, supra note 6, at 2144-46.
124. See Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 463
U.S. 582, 596 (1983).
125. See id. Public schools, however, usually accept federal funds as a matter of course
and without contemplation. After all, the school districts are slaves to federal funding.
The operation of the public school system in the United States depends upon Congressional
financial support. A public elementary or secondary school would unlikely be in a position
in which it could afford to forgo federal funding. But see Andrew Cain, Moran Bill Goes
For Funds: Seeks Federal Aid Rejected By Allen, THE WASH. TIMES, April 25, 1996, at C7
(Virginia Governor George F. Allen rejected Goals 2000 money from Federal Government).
126. Guardians,463 U.S. at 596.

127. See id.
128. "Since the private cause of action under Title VI is one implied by the judiciary
rather than expressly created by Congress, we should respect the foregoing considerations

applicable in Spending Clause cases and take care in defining the limits of this cause of
action and the remedies available thereunder." Id. at 597.
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In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme
Court determined that a damages remedy was available to a
female student who filed a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim under Title IX. 12
The Franklin court decided that
Congressional silence on the remedies issue did not foreclose a
Title IX plaintiff from seeking monetary relief for alleged
intentional gender-based discrimination. 13°
When Congress
creates a statutory cause of action that provides no intent to limit
the remedies available for implied rights that may arise from the
language of the statute, the court has discretion to award
appropriate relief, including private damages. 131
The Court
confined its provision of monetary relief under Title IX for hostile
environment sexual harassment, however, to cases establishing
intentional discrimination on the part of the school district.
According to the Court, allowing private actions against
educational institutions for unintentional violations under a
Spending Clause Statute such as Title IX would commit the
school districts to a financial risk for which they lacked adequate
notice.

13

The Court in Franklin, however, provided insufficient
guidance as to whether a school district's failure to remedy a
hostile environment resulting from peer sexual harassment was
an implicit violation of Title IX's prohibition against sexual
discrimination in the schools. 13 The implied action implicated in
Franklin concerns a school's obligation to react promptly and
129. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). A teacher
repeatedly and severely sexually harassed the plaintiff over a three year period. Id. at 63.
Despite their awareness of the problem, school administrators failed to intervene and in
fact advised the victim to refrain from pressing charges against the teacher. Id. at 64.
As the administrative process afforded her no personal relief for the damages incurred, she
pursued compensatory damages against the school district.
130. Id. Congress neglected to specifically mention within the Title IX statute, a private
cause of action for a harassed student against the school district. See id. Justice White,
however, concluded that once the court finds an intentional violation of Title IX, the
presumption that remedies are limited under statutes enacted under the Spending Clause
of the United States Constitution does not apply. Id. at 71-73.
131. See id. at 69.
132. "The point of not permitting monetary damages for an unintentional violation is
that the receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary
award."
Frankin, 503 U.S. at 74-75 (citing Penhurst State Sch. and Hospital v.
Halderman, 421 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). In the dissent Justice Scalia separated claims
according to whether they implicated implied or explicit obligations under the statute,
rather than the intentionaimintentional distinction offered by the majority. See id. at 76.
133. The Supreme Court did not conclude that Congress passed Title IX solely pursuant
to the Spending Clause, however, the court intimated that "intentional" discrimination was
a prerequisite for institutional liability. See Burrow v. Postville Community Sch., 929 F.
Supp. 1193, 1203 n.8, (N.D. Iowa 1996).

352

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 3:329

responsibly to a situation when an employee, namely a teacher,
sexually harasses a female student.'3 '
Further, even if the Court did recognize a duty on the part
of schools to properly address peer sexual harassment complaints
of its students in order to receive federal funds, it remains
unclear as to whether a student may petition a court for private
monetary relief because the school was derelict in its response.
As a result, the Court left two critical aspects of a hostile
environment peer sexual harassment claim open to scrutiny from
the lower courts: the issue of notice, and the issue of whether
intent or negligence is necessary on the part of the school district
before it incurs liability.'1
The Debate in the Circuits
Rowinsky and Davis
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Eleventh
Circuit interpreted the Franklin decision as inviting courts to
recognize monetary damages for peer sexual harassment claims
against the school district under the statutory scheme of Title
IX.1 3

The court believed that Title IX should afford students the

same protections in school that employees receive in the
workplace under Title VII.' 37
Directly transferring the
134. The issue of institutional liability for damages when an employee, especially an
instructor, sexually harasses a student is still unresolved. This winter, even with the
precedent of Franklin, the Fifth Circuit refused to hold the school liable when a karate
instructor sexually harassed a student in his class, unless the school had "actual
knowledge" of "underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger" to students.
See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District, 106 F.3d 648, 659 (5th Cir. 1997).
In this case, the student had indicated to a school counselor that she was having sexual
relations with her instructor. Id.
135. "Under such interpretation, confusion and disagreement arise in a case like the
present one in which the facts involve peer-to-peer sexual harassment, i.e. non-agent
harassment, which does not fall within the respondeat superior scheme of liability."
Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1203 n.8.
136. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996). In Doe v.
Petaluma City School District, upon reconsideration of the issues, the court proposed an
altered three prong test for liability in the aftermath of Davis- "that plaintiff was
subjected to unwelcome harassment based on her gender, that the harassment was so
severe or pervasive as to create a hostile educational environment, and that the
[d]efendants knew, or should in the exercise of their duties have known, of the hostile
environment and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action." 949 F. Supp.
1415, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
137. "[A] female student should not be required to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privelege of being allowed to obtain an education." Id. at 1194. See
generally, Christopher T. Nixon, Case Note, 64 TENN. L. REV. 237 (1996), for analysis
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substantive principles of Title VII hostile work environment case
law to the educational context, the court fashioned a legal
standard for institutional liability. The school is responsible for
damages if peer sexual harassment creates an abusive and
oppressive learning environment for female students. 13 The court
maintained a focus on the deliberate failure of school officials to
ensure that the educational institution was free from pervasive
sexual harassment regardless of who perpetrated the sexual
139
harassment: a teacher, an administrator, or a student.
As long as peer sexual harassment existed in the school and
school officials "knew or should have known" of its existence, they
must have made prompt attempts to remedy the situation.1 4° The
Davis court explained that centering the inquiry on whether the
school committed the harassing behavior ignores the nature of a
hostile environment claim. If the school allowed the oppressive
behavior to continue in its midst, the school effectively
discriminated against the victim on the basis of sex. The school
denied her an equal chance to share in the benefits that the
educational institution had to offer.14 1 The school permits the
student to endure inequities other students must not suffer,
simply because of her sex. The court, therefore, applied a
negligence standard, stating that sexual harassment, which
reached a pervasive and severe level, even though the harassers
were students, gave rise to an inference that the school possessed
knowledge or constructive knowledge of the oppressive learning
environment. 142 The Eleventh Circuit decided that knowledge of
a hostile environment creates a responsibility to respond swiftly
143
and sufficiently to the situation.
supporting the Davis decision.
138. "Thus, we conclude that as Title VII encompasses a claim for damages due to a
sexually hostile environment created by co-workers and tolerated by the employer, Title
IX encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile educational environment
created by a fellow student or students when the supervising authorities knowingly fail to
act to eliminate the harassment." Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193.
139. Another court commented that other courts following the Davis approach "focus not
on the fact that Congress enacted Title IX through the exercise of its spending power.
Rather, these courts focus on the fact that Title IX was enacted to prohibit discrimination
based on sex in the educational environment." Wright v. Mason City Community Sch.
Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
140. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1195.
141. "The evil Davis sought to redress through her hostile environment claim was not
the direct act of a school official demanding sexual favors, but rather the officials' failure
to take action to stop the offensive acts of those over whom the officials exercised control."

Id. at 1193.
142. See id. at 1195.
143. The dissent would hold, however that (1) Title IX should not encompass
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Perturbed by the Eleventh Circuit's proposal of a negligent
standard, the Fifth Circuit adopted in Rowinsky v. Bryan
Independent School District, an opposite stance that effectively
insulates the school districts from liability for peer sexual
harassment in the schools.'" An emphasis on the lack of agency
between the school district and the students led the court to
conclude that the school could not be liable for the transgressions
145
of third parties under Title IX, a Spending Clause statute.
Under the agency theory of analysis, the court found that the
school district has insufficient notice to know it is open to
liability.' 46
Turning to the application of Title VII, the court asserted
that Title VII anti-discrimination principles are intended to
ameliorate the effects of sexual harassment in the context of
unequal power. 147 Harassment between students, according to
the court, is harassment between equals, and, therefore, does "not
carry the same coercive effect or abuse of power as those made by
a teacher, employer, or co-worker." 14s Absent some basis to
impute the actions of students to school officials, the court
concluded that Title VII hostile environment theories are
inapplicable to peer sexual harassment in the schools. 149 The
student-on-student harassment; (2) even if it does apply, the courts should limit its
application to intentional behavior, and (3) if the courts do extend Title IX's provisions to
cover unintentional conduct on the part of the school, they should at least limit the remedy
to injunctive relief. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1195-96 (Birch, J., dissenting).
144. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cart. denied, 117
S.Ct. 165 (1996).
145. As Title IX is a Spending Clause statute, '[ilmposing liability for the acts of third
parties would be incompatible with the purpose of a spending condition, because grant
recipients have little control over the multitude of third parties who could conceivably
violate the prohibitions of Title IX." Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013.
146. One commentator suggests that the Fifth Circuit exhibited a misplaced fear that
a recognition of the claim would impose strict liability upon the schools. See Case
Comment, Sexual Harassment--4tleIX-Fifth Circuit Holds School District Not Liable for
Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment: Rowinsky v. Bryan School District, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 787, 790-91 (1997) [hereinafter Case Comment]. The real debate, however, iA between
the application of either a negligence or an intent standard. See supra notes 62-98 and
accompanying text.
147. Ironically, the court cites to the theories of Catherine MacKinnon, first advocate for
the creation of a sexual harassment cause of action, in order to afford fewer protections
to the rights of girls in the schools than their counterparts in the workplace receive.
Assuming sexual harassment is a power issue, and the only reason to address the problem
is because of this, no need exists to thwart sexual harrassment where there is no power
relationship. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d at 1011 n.11. Peer sexual
harassment, however, is not just about power. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying
text.
148. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1011 n.11.
149. The dissenting judge argues, however, that it is disingenuous to assert that the
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court focused primarily on the discrimination caused by the actual
harassment, rather than the response of the school district to the
situation. 15° The Rowinsky court's curt treatment of institutional
responsibility in the matter produces a proposition that has
serious implications for girls who fall victim to peer sexual
harassment.1 51 In essence, the court concluded that if a girl
cannot establish that the school district addressed male claims
differently than her claims, even if no procedure at all exists to
deal with the problem of harassment, the school incurs no
52
liability.
The Reaction of the District Courts
The intermediate positions brewing in the district courts
manipulate the legal understanding of both intent and notice in
order to arrive at a legally acceptable basis for institutional
liability in the peer sexual harassment context.'53 These courts
are wary of contorting available legal reasoning so as to
contradict the statutory constructs of Title VII and Title IX and
the established case law interpreting these statutes. The district
courts have adopted a more sensitive approach than that
manifested in the Rowinsky opinion. 5 4 Unlike the court in
Davis,155 however, the other districts also attempt to grapple with
school exercises no power or control over the school children. Even though the relationship
is not economic, a relationship exists between the harassers and school officials which
creates a duty on the part of the school to counteract peer sexual harassment. See id. at
1024 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 1016. The Department of Education observed that the Rowinaky decision
misunderstood institutional liability under Title IDC The Office of Civil Rights emphasized
that, "fitle IX does not make a school responsible for the actions of the harassing student,
but rather for its own discrimination in failing to act and permitting the harassment to
continue once a school official knows that it is happening." See Sexual Harassment
Guidance, supra note 28, at 12048 n.27.
151. Without the threat of private law suits, schools will not address the problem of peer
sexual harassment. See Case Comment, supra note 146 at 790.
152. "In the case of peer sexual harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
school district responded to sexual harassment claims differently based on sex. Thus, a
school district might violate Title IX if it treated sexual harassment of boys more seriously
than sexual harassment of girls, or even if it turned a blind eye toward sexual harassment
of girls while addressing assaults that harmed boys." Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1015. The
court ignores the distinct inherent differences between sexual harassment claims and other
claims.
153. The dissension stems from the courts' differing views as to the scope of duty Title
IX places on educational institutions not to discriminate on the basis of sex." Wright v.
Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1418 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
154. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117
S. Ct. 165 (1996).
155. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (1lth Cir. 1996).
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the implications of utterly disregarding notice and intent
principles by casually transferring Title VII standards to a
situation that only arises in an educational setting.' 56
Peer sexual harassment in the schools creates a situation
idiosyncratic to the schools. Title VII jurisprudence, even though
substantively similar, does not apply to the problem of extending
institutional liability where no financial connection exists between
the harasser and the institution. In efforts to placate legal
precedent and statutory construction, however, the courts in many
districts have formulated standards under Title VII that present
a threshold of proof which renders it almost impossible for a peer
sexual harassment victim to assert a legitimate claim against the
school district. 157 Essentially, two queries receive attention from
the courts: the determination of the criteria for intentional
discrimination and the establishment of an acceptable level of
notice which would trigger institutional liability.
The district courts have extracted from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools a principle
that limits cognizable Title IX claims to those which allege
intentional discrimination on the part of the school. 15
"Intentional," however, is an ambiguous marker for liability. 15 9
The Supreme Court neglected to specifically inform the courts as
to what constituted Title IX intentional discrimination beyond
156. In Davis, the court hid behind the Supreme Court's mandate that Title IX be read
broadly. See Davis, 74 F.2d at 1192 (citing North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512, 521 (1982)). "The Davis court perceived public policy reasons for ensuring that
schoolchildren receive at least as much protection as workers." Doe v. Petaluma City Sch.
Dist, No. C 93-00123 CW, 1996 WL 432298, at *5. See also Bruneau v. South Kortright
Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Title VII jurisprudence is a
guide, and a Court should not blindly apply Title VII to determine the issues raised in a
Title IX case.").
157. If the courts emphasize intent and exhibit an exaggerated fear as to whether the
standard for liability appears like "negligence," then many overtly delinquent approaches
that the schools adopt will pass muster. For example, in Wright, even with no procedure
or program in place, the court found the school's conduct to be "negligence at best." Wright
v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1420 (N.D. Iowa). The court
conceded that "the school district through its lack of training and experience was not well
equipped to handle this terrible situation." Id. The court, however, failed to see the
evidence as going beyond "past negligence and into reckless or intentional discrimination."
Id.
158. ". . . [11n explaining that intentional discrimination creates a prima facie
entitlement to monetary damages under Title IX in a way that unintentional conduct
simply does not, the Franklin decision implicitly holds that intentional discrimination is
an element of a claim that the school district has violated a plaintiff's rights under Title
IX . . ." Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schools, 890 F. Supp.1452, 1464 (N.D.Ca. 1995)
(citations omitted).
159. See Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1982).
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those situations analogous to the employment context. The
district courts, deriving partial guidance from Title VII
jurisprudence, have reasoned that a showing of intentional
discrimination requires proof that a student receives disparate
treatment on the basis of her sex as a direct result of a school
district's course of action in response to peer sexual harassment. 16°
Although the courts retreat from a mandatory showing of direct
discriminatory animus, they still demand more than raw
disparate impact evidence before concluding that the school
district intentionally discriminated against the harassed
161
student.
In the wake of Franklin, the courts are distinguishing
intentional violations
of Title
IX from unintentional
transgressions. The courts proffer that intentional violations
warrant an entitlement to monetary damages. Unintentional
violations, however, although sufficient according to the negligent
standard of Davis, evince insufficient notice to hold a school liable
pursuant to a Spending Clause statute. 162 The courts view proper
notice as critical in cases of peer sexual harassment. In the
absence of grounds to hold the school vicariously liable for the
actions of students, who are under their control, but who are not
their agents, proof of notice bridges the gap between the students
and the school district.163
The courts are unable to completely abandon notice
considerations associated with Spending Clause statutes. They,
therefore, shy away from incorporating the "knew or should have
known" language within the fifth element, the element that
establishes some basis for institutional liability.1 64 For instance,
in Wright v. Mason City Community School District,165 the court
struck a compromise between the absolutes put forth by the Davis
and Rowinsky courts. Wright put forth a modified version of the
Title VII standard by advocating 'that the educational institution
knew of the harassment and intentionally failed to take proper
remedial measures because of the plaintiff's sex."16 Generally,
160. See Doe, 1996 WL 432298 at '7-*8.
161. See id. at *5.
162. See Oona RI-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1464.
163. See id.
164. "The Supreme Court's opinion in Franklin explicitly demands more than mere
negligence to create liability for monetary damgages for a violation of Title IX --it requires
plaintiffs to show an intent to discriminate." Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist.,
940 F. Supp. at 1419.
165. Wright, 940 F. Supp at 1419.
166. Id. at 1419 (citing Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193,
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absent clear legislative intent to impose a duty, the courts
manifest an uneasiness about imposing such a duty upon the
schools to guarantee students that they will be safe from
discrimination by third parties. 167 The courts, therefore, expand
or contract their understanding of what amounts to "knowledge,"
rather than making an explicit ruling on whether the school
officials are responsible for policing the halls and classrooms for
peer sexual harassment.
Knowledge, or notice, gauges the school district's level of
awareness that peer sexual harassment is a problem in their
schools. In Burrow v. Postville Community School District, the
court clings to an "actual notice" requirement. This requirement
prevents the circumstantial evidence from circumventing the
intentional/unintentional distinction and slipping into a negligence
standard. The court chose to constrict liability, however, by
requiring "evidence of the school's failure to prevent or stop the
sexual harassment despite actual knowledge of the sexually
harassing behavior of students over whom the the school
exercised some degree of control." I6 The school district must
have actual notice of the harassment; therefore, a Title VII
"should have known" standard is insufficient. Another approach,
adopted by the court in Bruneau v. South Kortright Central
School District,I6 refused to resort to a negligence standard;
however, the approach introduced another source of institutional
liability other than actual notice. The school district risks being
held liable for peer sexual harassment under Title IX if the school
district has implemented "no reasonable avenue of complaint" for
victims.170 With notice, the school districts' inadequate attempts

to cure the harassment suffered by its students may produce an
inference that they sought to promulgate, rather than eradicate,
a hostile learning environment that denies students equal benefits
on the basis of gender. 7 '
at 1205-05 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (emphasis added).
167. Oona R.-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1466 n.12.

168. Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205.
169. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
170. Id. at 177. This requirement may provide impetus for the schools to formulate
proper complaint procedures, however, it depends on what the court means by "reasonable."
The EEOC recommends that if a school "has an expressed policy against sexual
harassment and has implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual
harassment," and the victim chooses not to take advantage of these procedures, then the

school is shielded from liability. Id. at 173 n.10.
171. Conversely, the courts will implicitly find the schools possessed notice that their

actions could expose them to liability under Title IX if the court determines that the school
intentionally discriminated against its students on the basis of gender. See Bruneau, 935
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The protections ultimately afforded the student in the case
of peer sexual harassment depend upon whether the court prefers
a broad or narrow understanding of the word "intentional." A
strict interpretation of the intent requirement inches the analysis
closer to the bar on peer sexual harassment claims that the court
A willingness to infer intent from
erected in Rowinsky.
circumstantial evidence, however, creates a wider base of
institutional liability. Some district courts will consider "evidence
of the school's failure to prevent or stop the harassment despite
actual knowledge, the school's toleration of the harassing behavior
and the pervasiveness or severity of the harassment."172 This
language implicates school districts on two possible levels:
imposition of liability for both actual and constructive notice. A
school could be liable for failing to act when the student clearly
informs the school of the sexual harassment, and when the
harassment is so intense or pervasive as to give the school
constructive knowledge of a problem. Other courts may not
consider a broad range of evidence. Although another court noted
"[s]uch discrimination may manifest itself in the active
encouragement of peer harassment, the toleration of the harassing
behavior of male students, or the failure to take adequate steps
to deter or punish peer harassment." 173 This language imposes
it is unclear as to whether constructive
a duty to act, however,
174
notice is adequate.
IV. EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES IN A LEGAL CONTEXT
Power, Agency, and the Spending Clause
Power and Agency
The conceptualization of sexual harassment in terms of a
power struggle directs courts to distinguish the legal liabilities for
workplace peer sexual harassment from those liabilities that
should be extended to the educational setting.175 Essentially,
F. Supp. at 169 n.2.
172. Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1204 (citing Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School District, 904 F.
Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D.Mo. 1995)).
173. Oona R-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1469.
174. In Burrow, for instance, the school district had actual notice and failed to act. See
929 F. Supp. at 1206.
175. If society understands sexual harassment in terms of the male drive for sex, then
peer sexual harassment in the schools is not qualitatively different from harassment in the
workplace, even in the absence of the power dynamic. See notes 79-81 and accompanying
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female students and female employees suffer the same harm;
however, the law treats the liability of a school district under
17 6

Title IX differently than that of a company under Title VII.

A power focus coerces the courts to concentrate on the economic
underpinnings that are relevant to the relationships between the
harassers and the institution, as well as the harassers and the
victims. 177 Vicarious liability, therefore, informs the court as to

the scope of employer or institutional responsibility to battle peer
sexual harassment present in those environments under their
supervision, whether the classroom or the boardroom.
Employers have an economic interest in their employees.
This agency relationship' 78 , and its corresponding extension of
power, imposes an obligation upon the employer to prevent
employees from utilizing sexual harassment as a tool to exercise
power on the basis of gender over other employees. Following
this premise, peer sexual harassment in the schools implicates
different issues and different harms than co-worker sexual
harassment. Therefore, Title VII principles of liability are too
encompassing. 179 As students are not economic agents of the
school district, the absence of the transfer of power places the
harassment outside the purview of the school officials.
text.
176. In Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., the court noted that "[tihe damage caused
by sexual harassment . .. is arguably greater in the classoom than in the workplace,
because the harassment has a greater and longer lasting impact on its young victims, and
institutionalizes sexual harassment as accepted behavior. Moreover, as economically
difficult as it may be for adults to leave the workplace, it is virtually impossible for
children to leave their assigned school." 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1996). See also
Eriksson, supra note 6, at 1808-09.
177. The manipulation of organizational power becomes the central evil in a workplace
harassment claim, however, the real harm constitutes an attack on a female's reproductive,
not economic or political resources. The temptation arises, therefore, to categorize peer
sexual harassment as a lesser evil in light of the fact that organizational power is missing.
As such, society presumes that the impetus to construct legal rather than private solutions
to the problem of peer sexual harassment is less paramount. See Studd, supra note 32,
at 54.
178. "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting in the scope of
their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957). If the employee is
not acting within the scope of his employment then the employer is not liabile unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Id. § 219 (2)(a)-(d).
179. See, e.g. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195-96 (Birch, J.,
dissenting).
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In fact, implicit in the way courts approach the problem of
peer sexual harassment in the schools is the presumption that in
the absence of unequal power, the sexual interplay of children is
innocent and natural even if it rises to the level of harassment.1 80
This attitude mirrors precisely that thinking which inhibits
schools from properly addressing the issue of peer sexual
harassment, and in so doing denies girls an equal opportunity to
enjoy the benefits of an education. Evolutionary theories vitiate
the court-erected distinctions between school harassment and
workplace harassment. Under an evolutionary theory, sexual
harassment is not a means of maintaining economic control and
power; it is a means of obtaining sexual access through coercive
tactics.
The school maintains a significant amount of control over
students' conduct in the educational setting, even though students
are not the agents of the school district.181 For example, the
school has authority to discipline students for disruptive behavior.
Victims may, therefore, reasonably interpret a school's choice to
allow abusive sexual harassment to continue as an endorsement
of that behavior: even though the initial act of harassment does
not involve institutional consent, the consent becomes implicit
when the school neglects to redress the problem. In addition to
the ability to assuage or eliminate the presence of peer sexual
harassment through reasonable regulations, the school also has
an obligation to protect students in its care from foreseeable types
of harm.182 Surveys and studies indicate that sexual harassment
clearly has more egregious ramifications for female victims than
males, and reported harassment reveals that it is a pervasive
problem in American schools. At a minimum, schools should take
reasonable measures to discourage and punish sexual harassment,
as well as adopting convenient and uiiintimidating grievance
procedures. A school has the statutory duty under Title IX to
prevent the occurrence of sex discrimination during educational
180. School officials admit that, 'it's difficult to change behavior that in the past was
often dismissed as kids being kids." Morning Edition: Parents Now Sue Schools for
Allowing Sexual Harassment (National Public Radio broadcast, October 5, 1994)
[hereinafter Morning Edition]. Without an attempt to instigate aggressive policies,
however, many schools will remain bound by these dangerous attitudes.
181. "The ability to control and influence behavior exists to an even greater extent in
the classroom than in the workplace, as students look to their teachers for guidance as
well as for protection." Davis, 74 F.3d 1186 at 1193.
182. "That parents yield so much of their children's care into the hands of public school
officials may well be argued to place upon the officials an obligation to protect students

at least from certain kinds of foreseeably dangerous harm during regular school hours."
Davis, 74 F.3d 1186 at 1193.
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programs and activities under its control and supervision. The
permission of pervasive peer sexual harassment indirectly
discriminates against girls.
Administrative Channels Versus Private Causes of Action
Those persons who oppose actions for monetary damages
against the school argue that the proper approach to expunging
peer sexual harassment from the schools is through the
administrative process established under Title IX.18 3 If the school

inadequately provides for grievance procedures or insufficiently
addresses a student's complaint,1s4 the student can lodge a
complaint against the school district with the Department of
Education.18 5 Upon finding a violation of Title IX, if the
Department of Education can not obtain voluntary compliance
with agency guidelines, the Office of Civil Rights will initiate
administrative proceedings against the school district.'86 The
school risks termination of all federal funding if the record
Once the
establishes that a Title IX violation exists.18 7
complainant has entered the administrative process, however, she
loses control over her action and must submit to the objectives of
the Department of Education and the Department of Justice.' ss
183. Title IX adopts and incorporates the procedural requirements of Tile VI, found at
34 C.F.R. §§ 100.6 to .11 (1997) and 34 C.F.R. pt. 101 (1997). 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1997).
184. The Department of Education promulgates agency regulations to ensure insitutional
See 34 C.F.R.
compliance with Title IX's proscription against sex discrimination.
§106.1-.71 (1997). The Department places the affirmative obligation upon school districts
to create and instigate formal grievance procedures that will allow for the "prompt and
equitable resolution" of sex discrimination complaints. The Department also requires that
schools employ a counselor to facilitate the proper working of the complaint procedure. See
34 C.F.RI§ 106.8-.9 (1997). A student either utilizes a school district's internal grievance
process, or in the alternative lodges a complaint with the Department of Education.
185. The Office of Civil Rights within the Department of Education reviews sex
discrimination complaints and determines whether the recepient of federal funds has failed
to comply with Title IX. See, Sherer, supra note 6, at 2145.
186. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1997).
187. The Department of Education may also assign prosecutorial responsibility to the
Department of Justice. The Department of Justice will decide whether to pursue an action
against the school district in the courts. See Sherer, supra note 6, at 2145.
188. See, e.g., Morning Edition, supra note 180 One parent of a harassment victim
noted:
[t]he discipline wasn't tough enough and the incidents didn't stop. So, Sandy
Wright filed a complaint with the federal Department of Education's Office of
Civil Rights, which came to Mason City to investigate, and concluded that
Heather had been sexually harassed. The school agreed to implement new
sexual harassment policies, but, the Wrights say, by that time the damage
had been done.

1997]

PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS

363

The agency regulations do not afford the complainant any
specific remedies for the harms inflicted upon her. 8 9 Even
though the school will most likely implement proper procedures
in order to avoid forfeiting federal funding, the harassed victim
receives no compensation under this administrative scheme. 19°
Although the denial of funds spurs schools to action once the
Department of Education finds a violation, schools have no
incentive to implement proper procedures before receiving a
sanction.' 9' Whereas, if the schools believed themselves to be
liable to victims for monetary damages, they would take
preventive measures to address the problem of peer sexual
harassment in order to insulate themselves from liability.19
Notice, Intent, and DisparateImpact

The courts

should scrutinize legal doctrine

with the

presumption that peer sexual harassment inflicts serious harm in
both schools and workplaces. The courts should afford victims in
both contexts the legal right to realize damages against the
institution who manages the working or educational environment
in a way that either tolerates or negligently monitors the
perpetration of peer sexual harassment.
Incorporating
evolutionary data within the legal framework provides direction
on three fronts: determining the level of notice the institution
must possess, defining "intentional," and recognizing the need for
a differential impact standard.
Notice Standard
The pervasive nature of peer sexual harassment favors the
application of a constructive, rather than actual notice standard, 193
189. See Eriksson, supra note 6, at 1806.
190. A tension exists under Spending Clause statutes such as Title IX. Such a statute
provides for protection of each student's right to receive equal educational treatment and
benefits, however does not afford specific compensation for the harms suffered by the one
receiving unequal treatment. The administrative and injunctive remedies address the
correction of the problem, not past and present harm to the victim. Unlike the workplace
context, when a student becomes victim to sexual harassment, no economic harm results.
Therefore, quantifiable relief such as back pay is not relevant. See Franklin v. Gwinnet
County Public Schools, 503 U.S. at 76 (1992). Private causes of action recognize the
special harm the victim suffers as a result of severe and pervasive sexual harassment, and
encourage victims to endure the complaint process.
191. See Eriksson supra note 6, at 1817.
192. Id.
193. As a .substitute for actual notice, constructive notice attaches 'where a defective
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when the courts assess whether the school knew of the harassing
behavior. 1' However, the majority of the courts exhibit hostility
toward the relinquishment of an actual notice requirement for
fear of using a negligent standard in a case where non-agent
third parties perpetrate the conduct.'9 5 As a result, courts cling
to an actual notice prerequisite and thereby assign the victim the
responsibility of making a hostile environment known to the
school officials.'9
This formal requirement disadvantages girls,
who as a group demonstrate a reluctance to report sexually
humiliating experiences to school officials.'9 The school thereby
reserves the right to harbor its misconceptions that peer sexual
harassment is innocuous and ignore the behavior, unless a female
condition has existed for such a length of time that knowledge thereof should have been
acquired in the exercise of reasonable care." Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist.,
935 F. Supp. 162, 173 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Fiorella v. Calomiris, 1996 WL 288471 *3
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
194. But see Morning Edition, supra note 180 ("School officials fear costly settlements
of [lawsuits] in an era of tight budgets, and they say it's not clear under what conditions
a school could be held liable for such student behavior."). The new agency Guidance on
peer sexual harassment, employee sexual harassment, and third party sexual harassment,
however, provides schools with information on this front. See Sexual Harassment
Guidance, supra note 28, at 12,042-43 ("Recipient's Response").
195. "This Court finds that to establish a Title IX claim for a hostile learning
environment created by peer-on-peer sexual harassment, the Plaintiff must show that the
school and/or school board received actual notice of the sexually harassing conduct and
failed to take action to remedy it. Liability will not lie if the Plaintiff can show only
constructive notice." See Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 173. The courts fear holding the
schools liable for every incident of harassment in the educational environment. The Office
of Civil Rights, however, adheres to a "constructive notice" standard. Further, "if a school
otherwise has actual or constructive notice of a hostile environment and fails to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action, a school has violated Title IX even if the
student fails to use existing grievance procedures." See Sexual Harassment Guidance,
supra note 28, at 12042.
196. In Bruneau, a female harassment victim did not file a written complaint, therefore,
the court held the school could be found not to have "actual notice." 935 F. Supp. 176 at
182. Actual notice requirements in most contexts invite penalization of the victim for
taking inadequate efforts to report the harassment.
197. Many cases of peer sexual harassment go unreported. See Eriksson, supra note 6,
at 1800 n.14. For example, an Ohio student refrained from reporting an eighth grade boy
for making obscene gestures to her. She explained that, "I was scared to say anything to
my teacher, and he never did anything about what he saw." Pera, supra note 20. The
reporting process is intimidating for female victims. As one student commented, "I can
understand why a person wouldn't feel comfortable talking to an authority figure. Maybe,
first they could talk to a student that everyone knew, that everybody felt comfortable
around." LARKIN, supra note 16, at 133. Unless the schools are sensitive to the nature
of the problem of peer sexual harassment when formulating reporting procedures, in
essence girls will not utilize the process. With this reluctance, a requirement of actual
notice effectively renders peer sexual harassment a problem seen, but not talked about.
As such, the school districts will rarely have "actual notice" of the problem, and therefore,
under current legal thinking, will rarely have an obligation to do anything. See also,
Goodman, supra note 18 (referring to the findings of Mary Roe of MIT).
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student explicitly informs school officials differently. An actual
notice requirement assumes, first, that a formal grievance
procedure is in place, 198 and second, if such a procedure exists
that it encourages traumatized girls to report specifically in the
case of peer sexual harassment.199
In light of the rampant peer sexual harassment occurring in
American schools, a constructive notice standard is necessary to
protect female students. Constructive notice liability would
mandate that the schools monitor their classrooms and halls and
take actions to neutralize the discriminatory harm inflicted upon
students, as opposed to assuming the interplay to be innocent
child's play.20° As an underlying drive to attain sexual access
gives rise to sexual harassment in both the workplace and school,
an institution in one context should be no less liable for failing
to address the problem. 2°1 Once the sexually harassing behavior
escalates to a degree as to justify an action for damages, 20 2 the

198. Several of the cases brought under Title IX for peer sexual harassment involve
school districts that have no policy in place to deal with the problem. See, e.g., Wright v.
Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Burrow v.
Potsville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
199. Critically, the Department of Education guidelines merely require that the school
districts have a grievance procedure in place. However, it does not require that the
grievance procedure specifically address peer sexual harassment complaints, just that it
properly deals with sexual discrimination complaints. See Sexual Harassment Guidance,
supra note 28, at 12,038 and 12,044.
200. The court in Doe v. Petaluma City School District stated, "thus it appears that
school districts are on notice that student-to-student sexual harassment is very likely in
their schools, particularly in junior high school. In light of this knowledge, if a school
district fails to develop and implement policies reasonably designed to bring incidents of
severe or pervasive harassment to the attention of the appropriate officials, it must be
inferred that the district intended, the inevitable result of that failure, that is a hostile
environment." No. C 93-00123 CW, 1996 WL 432298, at -11 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 1996).
Constructive notice, however, does not amount to strict liability. The standard is still a
negligent standard; the school must have been unreasonable not to address the peer sexual
harassment in light of its severe and pervasive nature. See Case Comment, supra note
146 at 790-91.
201. In the workplace, a "constructive notice" standard applies to sexual harassment
claims. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
202. The "pervasive and severe" requirement also operates as a check on the extension
of institutional liabiliy. Singular and minor incidents of harassment will not pass the
"pervasive and severe" prong of the test. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 28,
at 12034, and see supra note 195. Recently, the press has highlighted instances when
schools have sanctioned students for seemingly innocent violations of excessively strict
sexual harassment policies. See Tamar Lewin, New Guidelines on Sexual Harassment Tell
Schools When a Kiss Is Just a Peck, N.Y. TIMES, March 15, 1997, at A8. The Guidance
specifically adresses this issue, and hopes to not only provide direction on what constitutes
sexual harassment, but also, what does not. Id.
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school should not escape liability simply because it claims not to
have actual notice of the problem. 20 3
DiscriminatoryIntent
In addition to notice, the courts require that schools have the
intent to discriminate against students on, the basis of gender
when choosing their course of action in response to peer sexual
harassment. 2°4 Even if the plaintiff proves the school had notice,
whether actual or constructive, the school district is immune from
liability unless the plaintiff also shows the school intentionally
discriminated against her. Another dimension of notice becomes
inextricably tied up with this concept of intent, that is, a school's
awareness that its actions constitute sex discrimination under the
dictates of Title IX. As the statutory language of Title IX is
ambiguous, some courts regard the absence of direction on the
issue as a bar to finding the requisite level of intent.w In effect,
the courts construct an enclave of immunity for the school
districts, protecting them from the liability that flows from an
inference of discriminatory intent."
If Title IX's statutory purpose is to compel schools to ensure
that girls receive an equal education, courts can easily infer that
a school's acquiescence to the ramifications of peer sexual
harassment is a clear violation of this mandate. Evolutionary
data reveal that sexual harassment is a means by which boys
attempt to gain sexual access to girls. The obscene and abusive
remarks and gestures reflect not merely male interest in the
opposite sex, but also a campaign to coerce sexual access. A
school's determination that sexual harassment is not serious and
demands only minimal attention reflects an intent to overtly
203. At a minimum, the school should be held liable according to a constructive notice
standard if it provides "no reasonable avenue of complaint" for harassed victims. Bruneau,

935 F. Supp. 162, 177. The Department of Education, however, according to its proposed
peer sexual harassment guidelines, would have held the school strictly liable, that is, liable
even without notice, if the harassment was "pervasive and severe" and the school had no
grievance procedure in place. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 28, at 12,040.
204. See Burrow, 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1206 ("However, for the purposes of this motion
the court has assumed that the basis of institutional liability is the school district's own
intentionally discriminatory conduct in failing to appropriately respond to the harassment
of Lisa despite actual knowledge.") (emphasis added).
205. To be an intentional act, the offender must know the action or inaction is a
violation of the statute. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 (1996).

206. The Rowinsky opinion exploited this reasoning to extend its analysis so far as to
excuse from liability school districts that disregard peer sexual harassment claims from

female students, as long as the school districts also ignore the complaints of males. See
supra note 144.
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disregard the harm inflicted on individuals because of their
Even under the vague language of Title IX, the courts
gender.2
justifiably could conclude that the schools evinced the requisite
intent to discriminate."
Agency Action
In deference to legislative drafting, the courts evade
broadening the statutory meaning of Title IX to prohibit
that seem
Violations
discrimination.209
unintentional
unintentional according to the statutory language, however, may
appear more intentional in light of supplemental agency
regulations. 210 If the agency passes regulations imposing upon the
school obligations to ensure that peer sexual harassment does not
unduly restrict female students access and enjoyment of
educational activities and programs, then the school is on notice
that such behavior manifests an intent to discriminate on the
basis of gender.2 11 By referencing the administrative regulations,
the courts can conclude that the school had sufficient notice that
207. See Bosley V. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1220-21 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
208. Title IX states, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in this subpart, in providing any aid, benefit, or
service to a student, a recipient shall not, on the basis of sex:
(1) Treat one person differently from another in determining whether such
person satisfies any requirement or condition for the provision of such
aid, benefit, or service;
(2) Provide different aid, benefits, or services or provide aid, benefits, or
services in a different manner;
(3) Deny any person any such aid, benefit, or service;
(4) Subject any person to separate or different rules of behavior, sanctions,
or other treatment; [or]

Otherwise limit any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege,
advantage, or opportunity.
34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b) (1997).
209. As peer sexual harassment remains murky under the statute, the courts have
trusted an administrative system that corrects schools' unknowing violations of Title IX.
A refusal of funds acts as an ad hoc check against inappropriate supervisory behavior,
but, the courts consider monetary liability for unintentional discrimination to be an unfair
burden for them to place on the school districts under a Spending Clause statute. See
Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
210. See Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 645 (1983).
211. The courts point out that unlike Title IX, detailed regulations provide insight for
employers as to what practices may consititute sexual discrimination under Title VII. See
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 95-50811, 1997 WL 66087, at *8 (5th Cir.
Tex. Feb. 17, 1997) ("Title IX, by contrast, does not create any administrative body to
regulate private claimants' rights, and the regulations promulgated under Title IX make
no mention of sexual harassment."). Id.
(7)
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their actions violated the purpose of Title IX, without
over-extending the plain statutory language.21 2 The Department
of Education, therefore, has discretion to designate what is in fact
"intentional discrimination" under the broad language of Title IX
through the promulgation and publication of regulations and
guidelines.

213

In an effort to furnish the schools and the courts with
direction on the issue of peer sexual harassment, the Department
of Education has published "Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or
Third Parties" in an attempt to communicate the Office of Civil
Rights' position on school liability for peer sexual harassment
under Title IX. 21 4

These guidelines augment the published

regulation that directs the schools to formulate and publish
grievance procedures for sex discrimination complaints and to
appoint at least one employee to supervise its compliance with
Title IX.21 5

The Guidance attempts to recognize peer sexual

harassment as a legitimate, yet distinct, discriminatory concern
in American secondary schools.21 6

With the passage of the

Guidance guidelines, the courts will be more receptive to
recognizing personal claims against the school districts under
Title IX for sexual discrimination in cases when the school
districts fail to remedy peer sexual harassment, even though the
school did not do so with the intent to discriminate. 217 Therefore,
212. Under Title VI, another Spending Clause statute enacted to prohibit racial
discrimination, the courts recognize that the Office of Civil Rights could provide sufficient
notice that actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact would constitute intentional
discrimination by passing agency regulatioins pursuant to goals of the statute. See
Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. 162, 172 n.9. "Even if Title VI does not proscribe unintentional
racial discrimination, it nevertheless permitted federal agencies to promulgate valid
regulations with such effect.... Those charged with enforcing Title VI had sufficient
discretion to enforce the statute by forbidding unintentional as well as intentional
discrimination." Guardians Assoc., 463 U.S. at 591-92.
213. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1456 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
214. The Guidance consolidates directives on the issues of employee, third party, and
peer sexual harassment. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 28. When the
Office of Civil Rights resolves peer sexual harassment complaints it will consider whether
"(1) the school has a policy prohibiting sex discrimination under Title IX and effective Title
IX grievance procedures; (2) the school appropriately investigated or otherwise responded
to allegations of sexual harassment; and (3) the school has taken immediate and
appropriate corrective action responsive to quid pro quo or hostile environment
harassment." Id. at 12040.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Recently, in response to sexual harassment by teachers the OCR has also issued
proposed guidelines. 61 Fed. Reg. 52, 172-73. The regulations advise that "a school will
be liable for sexual harassment by its employees if the school has notice of the harassment
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the published agency guidelines, which require the officials to
promptly and adequately redress peer sexual harassment in the
schools, provide the courts with less precarious grounds for
extending institutional liability to hostile environment peer sexual
harassment claims in the schools. 218 As such, the Fifth Circuit,
as well as those courts constructing herculean hurdles over which
peer sexual harassment plaintiffs must leap, should now be more
receptive to enforcing Title IX through private claims against the
school districts for inadequate efforts to address peer sexual
harassment.

DisparateImpact Through an EvolutionaryPerspective
The agency Guidance, although comprehensive, does not go
far enough to protect victims of harassment. The guidelines
create a major distinction between Title VII and Title IX sex
discrimination jurisprudence by neglecting to adopt a disparate
impact standard. 21 9
The two areas, despite substantive
similarities will remain critically distinct jurisprudentially.
Although Title VII has codified language that prohibits policies
and programs which have a disparate negative impact on persons
because of gender, 220 the Guidance refrains from advocating that
particular line of reasoning within the educational context.
(i.e. knew or should have known of the harassment) but failed to take immediate and
appropriate steps to remedy it." Id. at 173. The Fifth Circuit, which decided Rowinsky,
indicated that once these proposed guidelines are promulgated, the court might consider
accepting sexual discrimination claims under Title IX when a teacher sexually harasses
or abuses a student. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F. 3d 648, 657 (5th
Cir. 1997). At that time, however, the court refused to find the school had notice. Id.
218. Previously, official administrative direction solely consisted of the issuance of
Letters of Findings by the Office of Civil Rights. This agency response to a particular
situation, however, was insufficient to provide the courts with a basis to find the schools
have notice of their duty to address peer sexual harassment complaints in a/l instances.
The agency's Guidance provides the schools with an explicit directive as to what conduct
regarding peer sexual harassment will subject them to sanctions under Title IX. See
Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 28.
219. Unlawful disparate impact occurs when a facially neutral employment practice
affects more harshly than others a group protected by Title VII than on others and "cannot
be justified by business necessity." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977). Courts are wary of extending the more expansive disparate
impact standard applied in Title VII cases within the Title IX context, especially for
non-employment sexual discrimination claims. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch.
Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 1997). In Bruneau, the Court categorized the Fifth
Circuit's position in Rowinaky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), as
an "equal protection, disparate treatment analysis." 935 F. Supp. 162, 171 n.7 (N.D.N.Y.
1996).
220. See infra note 228.
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Peer sexual harassment policies and grievance procedures may be
deemed proper despite the fact that they have a disparate impact
on female students. Further, the schools are not mandated to
develop grievance procedures which specifically attempt to address
peer sexual harassment claims, employee sexual harassment, or
third party sexual harassment claims.2 1 Extending Title IV
jurisprudence, an issuance of guidelines by the Department of
Education could encompass both intentional and unintentional
violations of Title IX by the school districts.22
Evolutionary
principles which inform society that peer sexual harassment poses
a more serious risk to female students in secondary schools
support the proposition that the Department of Education should
choose a disparate impact standard with regard to peer sexual
harassment. As the motivating factor of male sexual harassment
is a desire for sexual access according to evolutionary theory,
students direct the more severe and intense behavior towards
females, who as a whole, more adamantly protect their
reproductive resources.
Boys who sexually harass girls
subconsciously hope to instill fear and lower the self esteem of
females in order to render them more likely to grant sexual
access. Further, from an evolutionary perspective, girls have
more to lose than boys in a reproductive sense. Therefore, girls'
emotional and psychological responses to the harassment are
more grave than are boys: because the problem is more serious
for female students, policies which on their face seem neutral will
have a more adverse impact on girls than boys. 223

In order to

221. See supra note 212 and see generally Miller, supra note 11 (advocating the use of
Title VI as a springboard from which to apply Title VII principles within the framework
of Title IX).
222. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 172 n.9
(N.D.N.Y. 1996).
223. Notably, once policies are in place, both boys and girls will benefit. According to
evolutionary principles, the harm boys suffer is not as severe, therefore, the problem
becomes gender specific. An ardent look at the impact on girls allows the courts to use
Title IX as an initial means to force schools to instigate proper peer sexual harassment
programs and procedures. Although the new policies will assist females to achieve equity,
a sexually harassed boy will also have a better means for redress. In order to comply with
the naked language of Title IX, school officials must not ignore the peer sexual harassment
of boys, else they clearly discriminate on the basis of sex. In Seamons v. Snow, the court
rejected a high school boy's claim of sexual harassment because he failed to establish that
he incurred the harassment because of his sex. 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996). The court
did not even address the legitimacy of insitutional liability under the fifth element that
must be proven to succeed on a claim of sexual harassment. See id. at 1233. In addition
to the Seamons hurdle, even if the male plaintiff proves he was harassed because of his
gender, under the "pervasive and severe" element, the courts have held that the plaintiff
must be subjectively harmed. Evolutionary principles proffer that boys view sexual
harassment from girls as an invitation to sex. Sexual harassment does not undercut a

1997]

PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS

371

neutralize the educational environment so that female students
can enjoy the full benefits of school activities and programs,
school officials must either attempt to eradicate the harassment
or counteract the negative effects that females disproportionately
suffer. 224 In addition to the published guidelines within the
Guidance, a disparate impact standard would appropriately
address the disproportionate harms that female students
endure. 2
The Department of Education should further incorporate
within its regulations disparate impact language similar to that
used in the Title VII provision that codified disparate impact case
law. 22

A regulation should require that schools refrain from

adopting policies to address peer sexual harassment that
disparately impact students by sex, as long as the policy is
neither education-related nor necessary for the administration of
the schools. 227 If the school can establish that the policy does not
boy's sense of self worth, but rather reinforces it. As such, no subjective harm accrues.
If the policy exists and the school only uses it for female students, however, the school
manifests an overt intent to discriminate and the subjective harm becomes less important
to the analysis.
224. Not only must the school districts discourage harassing behavior, but they must
also encourage girls to effectively cope with the presence of such behavior. An appropriate
response would entail the promotion of female comradery in the face of harassment. An
evolved defense in some female primates involves thwarting male aggression through the
formation of female-bonded relationships. See Frans B. M. de Waal, Bonobo Sex and
Society, Sci. AM. 82, 87 (March 1995). As one commentator noted, however, male sexual
harassment tends to fracture female relationships.
In such a threatening environment, these young women knew that backing up
their assaulted classmate could put them at great risk ....
When a show of
mutual support is such a scary thing for young women, the potential for their
collective power is squashed. But, at the same time, their self-protective
silence only strengthens the collective power of the young men.
LARKIN, supra note 16, at 118-19.
225. Harm to girls may result, however, according to evolutionary logic, even if no
disparate treatment exists.
226. Under Title VII, an unlawful employment practice is established if:
[Tihe complaining party demonstrates that a repondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and the repondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity. Unlawful Employment Practices, 42 §
2000e-2(k)(1)(AXi) (1997).
If the respondent "demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the
disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice
is required by business necessity." Id. § 2000e-2(kX1)(B)(i). Title VII's language of
disparate impact, alternative practices, and necessity are easily transferrable to cases
under Title IX.
227. Intent occupies a less central role in the analysis when a disparate impact standard
applies. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., No. C 93-00123 CW, 1996 WL 432298, at
*9 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 1996).
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cause a disparate impact on the basis of gender, however, then it
need not prove either that the policy was education-related or
that it was necessary for the administration of the school.
This regulation would place the schools on notice that they
may be subject to sanctions or monetary liability under Title IX
for not making earnest efforts to address the peer sexual
harassment complaints of students and for not responsibly
supervising the behavior of harassing students. The schools
would also have to be sensitive to the effects that a chosen policy
would have on the different genders. The regulations would
propel schools to choose more proactive responses to the looming
problem of peer sexual harassment in American schools. Through
the use of hall monitors, programs designed to teach students to
avoid harassers and avoid perpetrating harassment themselves, 2
trained peer and adult counselors,2 and grievance procedures
sensitive to the specific problems of peer sexual harassment, the
schools could ensure that solutions emerge before damages accrue.
V. CONCLUSION

The seige against female secondary students is not an
exaggeration; peer sexual harassment is a reality that girls face
For every
every day in the halls and in the classrooms.
achievement, there exists a remark or a gesture that undercuts
girls' identities and their sense of safety. The high incidence of
peer sexual harassment in American schools requires that the
school districts make affirmative efforts to eliminate the
occurrence and effects of harassment. From an evolutionary
228. Girls often express that punishment of the aggressors alone is insufficient; female
empowerment is critical in the battle against peer sexual harassment. One female sixteen

year-old student who was interviewed commented:
I think that getting school administration to be receptive to reports of sexual
harassment is very important, but not enough. While you're tranining boys
not to harass, train girls how to deal with harassment on their own. If I had
reported this incident, and tried to make someone else do something about it,
I would have been even more of a victim than before. Sexual harassment is
victimization, and we need to fight that feeling most of all. Open ears to
reports are very important, but not enough; we need to have the ability to
throw off intimidation by ourselves, knowing that there is a support structure
for us if we need it.
STEIN & SJOsTROM, supra note 25, at 67. Evolutionary biology instructs society that half
of the problem is the motivations of the harassers, however, the other half is the

disproportionate effect harassment has on girls. In order to fully address the problem,
the school districts must not only deal with the harassers, but also counsel the harassed.
229. See supra text accompanying note 193.
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perspective, the schools present an especially attractive
environment for boys to engage in peer sexual harassment. The
severe psychological and emotional reactions of young women
correlate to their subconcious perception that their reproductive
resources are in jeopardy.
In order to create an atmosphere conducive to allowing both
genders to receive an equal education, the law should place
obligations upon the school to counteract the harassment. If the
courts or the agencies extend Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment principles to the educational setting, the school
districts will respond accordingly and formulate appropriate
remedies for the rampant peer sexual harassment in their midst.
Legal standards that emphasize notice and purposeful intent
disadvantage girls, because schools will be delinquent in
addressing the problem as long as they lack actual notice and
avoid the appearance of having the intent to discriminate. A fear
of monetary repercussions for past negligent efforts, however, will
prompt the schools to act against sexual harassment, rather than
merely reacting to the problem. A movement away from an
understanding of the problem solely in terms of inequality of
power will allow the legal analyis to embrace standards that
forcefully address the issue of peer sexual harassment in the
schools.
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